in Ludger Helms (ed.), Comparative Political Leadership, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 272-291, ISBN 978-0-230-29649-7. This chapter examines the differences between political leadership in old and new democracies. It operationalises the concept of political leadership as the decision-making authority of the president and/or the prime minister in these systems. It adopts an institutionalist approach to the study of political leadership.
institutions as sets of formal rules and established procedures. Institutions are not actors. Only people can act. However, institutions structure the behaviour of actors by providing incentives for them to behave in certain ways and to refrain from behaving in other ways. These incentives are not deterministic. Actors can always depart from them. Even so, an institutionalist approach places more emphasis on identifying the behaviour that is induced by institutions than on the idiosyncratic behaviour of human agents.
i Institutions are privileged in this way because they are considered to induce incentives that are both systematic and regular. They are systematic in that the incentives can be clearly identified. For example, a first-past-the-post electoral system produces a strong incentive for the emergence of a two-party system. They are regular in that the incentives are general and not context-specific. So, all else equal, a first-past-the-post electoral system produces such an incentive everywhere and at all times. The result is that if institutional incentives can be correctly identified, then institutions can be used to explain and, indeed, predict political outcomes. Shepsle (2006, p. 29) puts it as follows: "outcomes are clearly implied by the configuration of rules in a structured institution. These rules prescribe the mechanism for aggregating behaviors into a final result. Thus, any combination of behavioral repertoires by institutional politicians maps into a specific outcome".
This chapter privileges the study of institutions in the explanation of leadership outcomes. The focus is primarily on presidents, prime ministers, and legislatures rather than the incumbents who occupy these positions. The particular configuration of each leadership institution and the interaction between them provide incentives for actors to behave in different ways. These incentives can be deduced from a country's constitution and/or the law. For example, a powerful directly elected president will expect to propose policy solutions to the country's main problems, whereas a weak indirectly elected president will not be expected to do so. At the same time, institutions do not operate in isolation. Democracies operate according to the twin principles of the separation of powers and checks and balances. This means that different institutions may generate contradictory and/or competing incentives. For instance, a country with both a powerful directly elected president and a powerful fixed-term legislature is likely to find that the incumbents of both institutions will expect to propose policy solutions. These solutions may or may not be compatible. Viewed this way, leadership can be understood as the outcome of the competition between the various institutions in a country. While the precise configuration of the separation of powers and checks and balances is bound to vary from one country to another and, indeed, over time in any particular country, institutionalists identify similarities and differences in the general patterns of political leadership across countries. This chapter identifies differences in the patterns of political leadership between old and new democracies. In what ways are the institutional incentives in each of the systems different? How does the resulting decision-making authority of the various actors differ?
Presidential and prime ministerial leadership in old and new democracies

Identifying old and new democracies
To what extent do institutional differences generate distinct patterns of decisionmaking in old and new democracies? To begin, it is necessary to distinguish between these two sets of countries. For the purposes of this chapter, the set of current democracies is defined as those countries that have been awarded a Polity2 score of +6 or more for at least the last five consecutive years.
ii Within the set of current democracies, the old democracies are defined as those countries that already had the status of a Freedom House Electoral Democracy in 1989, which is the first year that Freedom House records this status, whereas the new democracies are defined as those countries that have been awarded this status at some point since 1990 inclusive.
iii Given this year corresponds to the standard beginning of the most recent wave of mass democratisations, it is a good cut-off point for distinguishing between old and new democracies. It should be noted that the Philippines and South Korea are included in the list of new democracies, even though they were both classed as Electoral Democracies in 1989. They are included because they democratised only at the very end of the 1980s. Therefore, it is reasonable to include them in the set of new democracies that emerged around this time. It should also be noted that this way of distinguishing between old and new democracies generates a set of seven hard-to-classify Latin American countries that democratised in the early and mid-1980s.
iv These countries could be classed as old democracies partly because they democratised a few years prior to the wave of democratisation that occurred at the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s and partly because in most cases they had already had at least some experience of democracy prior to their most recent democratisation. However, these countries could also be classed as new democracies because their most recent democratisation was close in time to the post-1989 democratisations elsewhere. To ensure that any results are not biased by this classification rule, the findings are reported on the basis of classifying them as both old and new democracies. In most instances, the results scarcely vary in whatever way these countries are classified. 
Presidential leadership in old and new democracies
What are the institutional differences between these two sets of countries and to what extent do any such differences generate distinct patterns of leadership? The first difference concerns the basic separation of powers. Here, a distinction can be made between presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary systems. A presidential system is where there is both a directly elected fixed-term president and a fixed-term legislature and where the cabinet is not responsible to the legislature. Under this system, there may be a prime minister, but, if so, then the prime minister is only individually responsible to the legislature or is not responsible at all. A parliamentary system is where the head of state is either a monarch or an indirectly elected president and where the prime minister and cabinet are collectively responsible to the legislature. Under this system, the legislature may serve for a fixed term or, more usually, it may be dissolved by the prime minister. A semi-presidential system is where there is a directly elected fixed-term president and where the prime minister and cabinet are collectively responsible to the legislature. Under this system, the legislature may serve for a fixed term or it may be dissolved prematurely by either the president and/or the prime minister. A further distinction can be made within the set of semipresidential systems. A president-parliamentary system is where the prime minister and cabinet are responsible to both the legislature and the president. A premier-presidential system is where the prime minister and cabinet are responsible solely to the legislature. A small number of countries do not fit any of these basic classificatory systems. The redistribution of regime types means that political leadership is less parliamentarised in new democracies than in old democracies. What is the effect of such a redistribution? Unlike prime ministers, directly elected presidents do not require the ongoing support of the legislature to remain in office. As a result, presidents are more independent of the legislature than prime ministers. In presidential democracies, presidents may try to legislate by decree when faced with opposition in the legislature. They may try to rely on more fluid patterns of support among the deputies in the legislature rather than the more structured patterns of party or coalition support that usually occur under parliamentarism.
In semi-presidential democracies, presidents often try to influence the behaviour of prime ministers, whereas they hardly ever do so in parliamentary democracies. Under semi-presidentialism, even during periods of French-style cohabitation when the parliamentary majority is explicitly opposed to the president, presidents still try to influence government policy, shape appointments to high public office, and so on. What is more, under presidentparliamentarism presidential influence is extremely high. Here, as Samuels and Shugart (2010) have shown, cohabitation almost never occurs under presidentparliamentarism. When presidents enjoy a parliamentary majority, they dominate the system. When they are opposed to the majority, they prefer to govern with independent prime ministers and with ad hoc majorities in the legislature rather than to allow the opposition to form the government.
Generally, the rise of semi-presidentialism since the late 1980s has generated a set of countries in which the crucial relationship is just as likely to be between the president and the prime minister and/or between the president and the legislature as between the prime minister and the legislature, which is typically the case under parliamentarsim.
The different patterns of presidential leadership between old and new democracies can also be observed by examining the constitutional authority of presidents and legislatures. Siaroff's (2003) That said, these results merely reflect the general redistribution of regime types over time rather than an increase in the power of presidents/heads of state within specific regime types. Table 3 shows that under presidentialism and premier-presidentialism presidential powers are only marginally greater in new democracies relative to old democracies. The same is true for heads of state in parliamentary regimes. Indeed, when monarchies are excluded from this category, then the power of indirectly elected presidents does not vary across the set of old and new democracies. Instead, the reason why presidents/heads of state are generally more constitutional authority in new democracies than in old democracies is that there are now far more countries with directly elected presidents. Given these countries tend to have more powerful presidents than parliamentary republics and, certainly, parliamentary monarchies, then new democracies as a whole exhibit higher Siaroff scores than old democracies.
Therefore, the primary emphasis should be on the impact of the redistribution of regime types across old and new democracies regime types, as above, rather than on the increase in presidential powers within individual regime types. Samuels and Shugart (2010) show that systems with directly elected presidents also have more presidentialised political parties. This characteristic impacts on prime ministerial leadership. For example, Samuels and Shugart (ibid., chap. 3) show that in parliamentary systems the prime minister, who is the principal political leader in the system, is much more likely to be an 'insider', meaning that they will have been the leader of their party at some point prior to assuming office, that they will have spent time on the party's executive and that they will have been elected to the legislature, than is the case for presidents in presidential systems. However, in premier-presidential systems prime ministers are more likely to be outsiders than in parliamentary systems and in president-parliamentary systems insider prime ministers are hardly ever appointed. In addition, Samuels and Shugart also show that regime type makes a difference as to how principal political leaders leave power (ibid., chap. 4). Here, the key observation is that in parliamentary systems prime ministers are more likely to leave office as a result of inter-party problems (coalition collapse) and intra-party dissent (heaves against the leader) than is the case for prime ministers in semi-presidential systems. Needless to say, directly elected presidents are scarcely ever dismissed for these reasons. Moreover, within semi-presidential systems, prime ministers are more likely to leave office for reasons relating to the president in presidentparliamentary regimes than is the case in premier-presidential systems. Thus, the redistribution of regime types has had an effect not just on the power of presidents and legislatures, but also on the political background of the person who becomes the principal political leader in new democracies and also on the ways in which prime ministers leave office.
The difference between old and new democracies can also be demonstrated in terms of the power of prime ministers. Unlike the situation for presidents, there are no general indices of prime ministerial power. Instead, the standard proxy for assessing the relative power of prime ministers is average duration in office (Baylis, 2007, p. 84) . In this chapter, the average duration is calculated as the number of prime ministers in a country divided by the total number of days since the first prime minister to take office after 1 January 1990 or since democratisation whichever is later until the date of the appointment of the current incumbent. The identification of prime ministers is taken from www.worldstatesmen.org. Prime ministers who headed governments that are officially identifed as caretaker governments are excluded. Reshuffles under the same prime minister and reappointments of the same person as prime minister without a break are not counted as separate periods. However, if the same person holds office on more than one occasion and there is a break, then each period is counted as a new prime ministership. To illustrate the methodology, the average duration of UK prime ministers is calculated as the number of prime ministers divided by the number of days from 28 November 1990 when the first prime minister to take office after 1 January 1990 assumed power until 11 May 2011 when the current incumbent took power. There were three prime ministers during this 7,105-day period, giving an average duration of 2,368 days. The average duration of Romanian prime ministers is calculated as the number of prime ministers divided by the number of days from 1 October 1991 when the first prime minister under a democratic Romania assumed office until 22
December 2008 when the current incumbent took up his position. There were seven prime ministers during this 6,293-day period, giving an average duration of 899 days. The average duration of prime ministers in old and new democracies and for each regime type is presented in Table 5 . Table 5 about here The main conclusion to be drawn from Table 5 should be remembered that in semi-presidential systems presidents serve for a fixed term, thus generating a degree of leadership stability even when there is turnover at the prime ministerial level. Overall, while it is certainly the case that in the last 20 years prime ministers in new democracies have spent less time in office than their counterparts in old democracies and while there is good reason to think that the shorter period in office has had considerable intra-and interparty ramifications, there is no reason to believe that the quality of prime ministerial leadership has necessarily been better in old democracies.
Political leadership in old and new democracies
There are different general patterns of leadership in new democracies when compared with old democracies. That said, it is important not to overestimate the differences between the two types of systems and for two reasons. the relationship between the president and prime minister is usually more conflictual outside cohabitation because presidents feel that they have greater legitimacy to intervene. In Central and Eastern Europe intra-executive conflict has also been a common feature of new semi-presidential democracies. Indeed, Sedelius and Ekman (2010, p. 525) have demonstrated that intra-executive conflict is a more powerful predictor of pre-term cabinet resignation in this region. Overall, therefore, while the redistribution of regime types has generated different patterns of leadership between old and new democracies, within any given regime type there are similarities between old and new democracies.
The second reason why the differences between old and democracies should not be overestimated is that there is variation in leadership patterns within any given regime type and indeed within any country over time. For example, while the average turnover of prime ministers in new democracies is greater than in old democracies, suggesting that political leaders are stronger in the latter than in the former, it is also the case that some old democracies are marked by weak prime ministers and that some new democracies have been characterised by strong leaders. In Japan, an old democracy, there has been a regular turnover of prime ministers and a strong leader has never really emerged. By contrast, in Hungary, a new democracy, a system of Chancellor Democracy has developed (Schiemann, 2006) . In 2010 Viktor Orbán was appointed as prime minister with the support a large legislative majority that allowed him to amend the Hungarian constitution and further institutionalise strong leadership. Similarly, in Slovakia, also a new democracy, Vladimír Mečiar served as prime minister from 1992-1998. He was a dominating and controversial figure in Slovakia's transition, personalising the political process (Haughton, 2002) . Therefore, while there are differences in political leadership between old and new parliamentary democracies as a whole, it is important not to imply that all new democracies operate in the same way or, indeed, that all countries within any given regime type in new democracies operate in the same way.
This point applies even more forcefully to semi-presidential and, particularly, premier-presidential regimes. In general, premier-presidential regimes are characterised by a dual executive in which there is both a fairly powerful president and a fairly powerful prime minister. This situation characterises old democracies, such as France, and new democracies, such as Bulgaria, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and Timor-Leste. However, within the set of both old and new democracies there are premier-presidential regimes with largely figurehead presidents and prime ministers who exercise leadership free from almost any presidential intervention. In Ireland, an old democracy, the president has very few powers and there is a strong head of government, the Taoiseach. In Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia, all new democracies, the directly elected president also has very few powers and, in practice, the prime minister is the principal political leader. This does not mean that the prime minister in these countries is necessarily a strong leader. In many of these new democracies, there has been considerable prime ministerial turnover. All the same, what these countries have in common is the absence of presidential leadership and only very rare examples of presidential/prime ministerial rivalry. In short, there is considerable variation within premierpresidentialism. Thus, the typical pattern of leadership under premierpresidentialism is not witnessed in all premier-presidential democracies. Overall, while it is reasonable to identify distinct patterns of leadership between old and new democracies, it is necessary to remember that such patterns represent general trends. There is always country-specific variation within these general trends.
Conclusion
Political leadership is a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon. One way of interpreting the nature of leadership is to see it as the decision-making authority of the principal political office-holders in a country, typically presidents and/or prime ministers. Institutions shape the authority of these political leaders, creating incentives for them to behave in certain ways. A general set of institutional incentives are created by the basic separation of powers in a country. Presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary regimes create different incentives. Across the set of old and new democracies there has been a redistribution of these regimes types, with directly elected presidents becoming much more prevalent than was previously the case. This redistribution of political authority has created basic differences in the patterns of leadership between old and new democracies. In new democracies there are stronger presidents, weaker legislatures and more complex relations generally between presidents, prime ministers and legislatures. In addition, new democracies have exhibited more fragmented party systems and have tended to adopt proportional electoral systems. These factors have combined to make it more likely that prime ministers remain in office for a shorter period of time when compared with old democracies. This does not mean that the quality of leadership has been worse in new democracies, but it has created a different political dynamic. All the same, within parliamentary democracies there are similarities between old and new democracies. The key relationship is still between the prime minister and parliament. Equivalent similarities can be found within the set of presidential and premier-presidential democracies as well. Moreover, institutional incentives are not deterministic. Even if the redistribution of regime types has generated differences in the general patterns of leadership between old and new democracies, there is variation within any given type of regime and indeed within any country over time.
Notes i
To put it another way, the impact of human agency on political outcomes will be found in the error term of a statistical equation, whereas the impact of institutions can be estimated directly.
ii Note that the Polity IV dataset does not include countries with a population of fewer than 500,000 people. Therefore, this study does not include countries such Source: See Table 1   Table 3 Mean (12) 1.00 (1) 3.75 (4) 0.60 (20) 2.95 (37) 1.50 (8) 4.36 (25) 6.92 (12) 7.14 (7) 4.33 (12) 1.50 (6) 5.24 (37) 1.50 (6) 5.24 (37) 6.60 (5) 1.00 (1) 3.75 (4) 0.60 (20) 2.03 (30) 1.50 (8) 3.39 (18) 6.89 (19) 7.14 (7) 4.33 (12) 1.50 (6) 5.50 (44) 1.50 (6) 5.50 ( (1) 1370 (4) 1750 (20) 1677 (25) 829 (7) 932 (13) 837 (6) 882 (26) Source: www.worldstatesmen.org
